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OUTLOOK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE U.S.
Dr. Hugh Kendrick, Vice President
Science Applications, Inc.
1710 Goodridge Drive
McLean, Virginia 22102

ABSTRACT

The strategic importance of nuclear power lies
in its contribution to: expanding electricity
supplies essential to economic growth; assuring
the nation's orderly transition from insecure
foreign oil to abundant domestic resources;
and eventually providing an essentially inex
haustible source of energy. The historical
partnership between the Federal Government and
industry in developing nuclear technology, in
cluding the reasons for decline in the last
five years, is described. Recent changes in
Federal policies and programs designed to en
able increased use of nuclear power are re
viewed. But the outlook will remain uncertain
for the near term until public confidence is
restored.
1.

The Role of Nuclear Energy

In recent years, nuclear power has provided
essential electricity through four major dis
ruptions of energy supply; the 1973-74 Middle
East oil embargo, the natural gas shortage of
1976-77, the national coal strike of 1978, and
the shortages attendant to the upheavals in
Iran in 1979. It is widely accepted that coal
and nuclear power are the only viable signifi
cant sources of electricity available through
the end of this century and the first decades
of the next. And electricity is one of the
domestic sources of energy that must be expand
ed to maintain a healthy, growing economy.
Moreover, the nation must continue an orderly
transition from an economy dependent on oil to
one that is fueled by diversified and secure
energy sources.

•

It enables electricity to be substituted
for oil consumption in all end use sectors
of the economy. Electrification has al
ready occurred in residential and commercial
space heating, industrial processes, and
private vehicles and light duty tracks.
And the additional potential is high.

t

It enables more of the nation's coal re
sources to be used for the production of
synthetic fuels, industrial applications
and export.

In order to eliminate our overdependence on
oil we must orchestrate two transitions;
firstly to move toward abundant domestic
sources, and secondly toward renewable or
essentially inexhaustible sources as these
technologies are developed.
The full potential of the fission energy con
tribution to electrical energy supply can
facilitate both these transitions, the first
in the ways just discussed, and the second
through the development of the fast breeder
reactor. As you know, development of the
breeder reactor will allow us to realize 60
times more energy from our uranium resources
than currently deployed light water reactors
(LWR). Thus, the complete fission energy
system includes the following four elements:'
the current LWR fuel cycle; LWR spent fuel
reprocessing (to supply plutonium for the
breeder reactor); the fast breeder reactor
fuel cycle; and immobilization and disposal
of high level wastes.
2.

The.Past

This four component nuclear strategy was recog
nized in the earliest days of the U.S. nuclear
program. Unlike many other technologies that
originated in the private sector, nuclear tech
• It enables electric utilities to economic
nology was created and fostered by the Federal
ally displace oil and gas burning base load Government
as an outgrowth of its wartime
power plants. In 1981 three million barrels weapons related program. Civilian nuclear
elec
by
daily
of oil and gas were consumed
under controlled conditions by
developed
power
tric utilities, much of it imported from
a Federal policy that fostered a commercial
insecure foreign sources. The U.S., in
nuclear technology. By
exploit
to
industry
contrast, has vast uranium resources.
Here is how nuclear power contributes to this
transition now:
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A 3.3'% annual growth rate in peak load (less
than is forecast by the electric industry and
less than needed to sustain the economic
growth rates called for by the Reagan Admin
istration) would double the peak load in 2000
to 880 GWe. Including a 20% reserve margin
and 50 GWe of retirements means that some 500
GWe capacity needs to be added by 2000.

1971 this national policy had evolved to where
the industry had announced plans for over 170
nuclear power plants, 30 were already in oper
ation, and nuclear fuel had been transferred
to private ownership. The Atomic Energy Com
mission (AEC) offered to assist the industry
develop reprocessing of spent fuel and recycle
of plutonium, and took the initiative in es
tablishing repositories for long term storage
of radioactive waste. The "Atoms for Peace"
program of assistance to other nations with
nuclear technology under international safe
guards was in full swing.
Ten years later, in 1981, the picture is in
stark contrast. The nation's nuclear indus
trial capability is eroding and the current
base of operating plants and plants under
construction is shrinking. Today there are
some 73 plants operating and 90 plants at
various stages of construction. Since 1976
more than 50 plants have been cancelled and
there is a defacto moratorium on construction
permits. This has come about through a com
bination of regulatory, financial and his
torical factors including a reduction in real
demand growth since the oil embargo and a
corresponding reduction in projected future
needs. An institutional paralysis set "in.
Commercial reprocessing has been unsuccessful
in 2 of 3 attempts for many of the same reasons.
The Federal Government failed to fulfill its
responsibility to provide timely disposal ser
vices for high level nuclear wastes. The
breeder program was off the tracks. The U.S.
Government became perceived as an unreliable
partner with industry and an unreliable sup
plier of nuclear technology abroad.

In fact about 230 GWe of coal and nuclear
capacity are in the pipeline, so another 270
GWe has to be ordered between now and 2000.
Some should be ordered now to avoid dangerous
ly low reserve margins in the late 1980's and
the last must be ordered within 10 years under
current assumptions for construction and
licensing. But utilities are continuing to
cancel current projects much less contemplate
adding new ones.
Clearly, to maintain our expectations for
economic growth and the increasing dependence
that we anticipate on electricity, something
must be done. To understand what and how we
must understand what went wrong.

What happened and why? A lot of things, for
complicated and interrelated reasons. The oil
embargo of 1973-74 and subsequent rise in
prices were in turn followed by reduced demand
and high inflation. An industry previously
used to 7% annual increases in electrical
demand was suddenly faced with growth rates
more like 3% and large uncertainties in fore
casting. Some projects were stretched out,
some cancelled. From a project standpoint, a
stretch-out will always mean the plant is more
expensive when completed, and in an era of
inflation, much more expensive. High infla
What happened? Why? Should anything be done; tion, as well as regulatory factors, caused
and if so, what? What is the Government doing? construction costs to soar for both coal and
nuclear plants. Even so when oil costs in
Are things any better now, how do they look
creased to $30/barrel in 1979, it became
for the future? Let's take a look at answers
cheaper to build and operate new coal and
to some of these questions.
nuclear plants than to continue to operate
existing oil plants. In addition, utilities,
3. The Present and The Future
among the most regulated of industries, are
faced with backward looking rate regulation
Should anything be done? Emphatically, yes!
that considers historical rather than current
It turns out that coal plants are also being
costs so that allowed rate increases nowhere
cancelled by utilities; what appears at stake
is not simply the absence of orders for nuclear near covered the increased and rapidly in
flating costs incurred for construction pro
power plants but the very future of the
nation's electricity supply. Some numbers may jects. The utilities are the most capitalintensive industry in the country (more than
help provide perspective.
20% of all capital in 1979) so they must fre
quently go to the financial markets, markets
An overview of electric generation capacity
shows that in 1980 some 600 GWe* existed, some that in 1979 after the Three Mile Island
100 GWe oil-fired, some 100 GWe of pre-1950
accident realized the financial risk a nuclear
plant can represent to the utility. All of
vintage and about half of which could be re
this has resulted in a serious and rapid de
tired by 2000. Peak load in 1980 was about
440 GWe indicating an average reserve margin of cline in the financial health of the utility
industry. In order to try to maintain finan
30% in contrast to the historically suggested
cial stability and regain financial health,
norm of 20%.
utilities are cancelling expensive construction
projects and avoiding commitments to future
*1 GWe = 10 watts of electricity.
construction.
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wrong. It appears that the Administration has
taken a look at the role nuclear energy can
play in the transitions to a secure and essen
tially inexhaustible energy supply I mentioned
earlier and has decided to reinstate the orig
inal four component nuclear strategy.

Practical problems in designing, constructing,
testing, operating and maintaining the newly
ordered plants began to occur. Problems
typical of the early evolution of new tech
nology but which are amenable to a disciplined
engineering approach. These problems were not
public health problems but they became caught
up in a regulatory process that grew to be
prescriptive and a disincentive to prompt
solutions. When the Nuclear Regulatory Com
mission (NRC) was statutorily formed in 1974,
the process of licensing and regulation of
nuclear power plants steadily became more com
plex, changeable with time and time-consuming.
Those committed to stopping nuclear power
found the new procedures afforded ample oppor
tunity to force delays and postponements. In
fact, the regulatory focus shifted more and
more to highly improbable accident scenarios
and prescriptive solutions, thus deflecting
attention from solving day-to-day reliability
problems. According to the Kemeny Commission,
this was an underlying cause of the circum
stances that led to the Three Mile Island
accident.

The new national energy policy plan was re
leased in mid 1981. It stressed that the
Government would no longer have a prescriptive
energy development plan but rather rely on
market forces and the private sector. Nuclear
power was to be allowed to compete fairly in
the market place again in contrast to the pre
vious era of not-so-benign neglect. The
stress was also on energy supply in recogni
tion of the American people's rejection of a
policy of settling for less.
In October 1981 a long-awaited nuclear energy
policy statement was released in which the
following policy initiatives appeared:
• A commitment was made to improve the regu
latory and licensing process with an ob
jective of reducing what now takes 10-14
years to the 6-8 years typical in countries
like Japan and France.

In short, nuclear power became entangled in a
regulatory web that did not enhance safety
but causes extensive delays, increased costs
(a 4 year delay in operation can add one
billion dollars in capital costs to a nuclear
plant today), and even raises the possibility
that an operator cannot ever bring his hardwon and expensive plant on line.

• Government agencies were directed to pro
ceed to demonstrate breeder reactor tech
nology and complete the Clinch River
Breeder Reactor (CRBR).

These problems, the failure of the Government
to come through on waste management, the pre
vious Administrations 1 commitment to nuclear
as an energy source of last resort, and the
creation of public fears in spite of the demon
strated safety record of nuclear power plants
all caused the public to lose confidence in
nuclear power and in the leadership of its
institutions. The message on the safety, eco
nomic and environmental benefits of nuclear
power as compared to alternatives has not got
through clearly enough.
Finally, the Government's commitment to repro
cessing was withdrawn and became much less
enthusiastic for the fast breeder. One reason
given was the concern for the spread of nuclear
weapons. Reprocessing spent fuel yields plutonium, a weapons usable material. It was
thought that avoidance of domestic reprocessing
(as opposed to export) would reduce the likeli
hood of foreign proliferation. This policy
did not lead to the reversal of national pro
grams on reprocessing or the fast breeder.
What is the Government doing now? A lot that
Is different from a year ago!Policies have
changed significantly and programs are taking
new direction and momentum that appear to be
directed at the causes of what previously went
7-18

• The indefinite ban on reprocessing by com
mercial interests was lifted.
• The secretary of energy was instructed to
work with industry and state governments
to proceed swiftly toward deployment of
means of high level radioactive waste
disposal and storage.
• A report on the obstacles to the increased
use of nuclear energy was required by
September 30, 1982.
Not everyone was pleased, of course. The
industry, while welcoming the sea change in
atmosphere, was disappointed at the lack of
government funds to support the demonstration
of reprocessing, the lack of commitment to
away-from-reactor spent fuel storage, and
felt that it should take much less than a
year to report on obstacles that most felt
were clear enough at the time. Opponents
spoke of the unequal budgetary treatment of
nuclear r&d compared to the fate of almost all
non-nuclear government-supported r&d. Others
were concerned that the wrong signals were
being sent on non-proliferation.
The rhetoric on reprocessing and the breeder
not withstanding, the change in nuclear nonproliferation policy (on which a statement was

released in mid 1981) from that of the previous
Administration's position at the end of its
term is not great. The fact is that avoidance
of nuclear weapons proliferation overseas has
always been a top priority policy of the
Government actively supported by the AEC (and
its successors) and the Congress. Export con
trols have been and continue to be a principal
vehicle. The new policy does contain an expli
cit provision to reestablish the U.S. as a pre
dictable and reliable partner for peaceful
nuclear cooperation.
My perception is that the Department of Energy
has significantly altered its programs in res
ponse to the policy changes in the following
ways. In general, the Department's strategy
seems to derive from the historic Federal role
for energy technologies to provide an appro
priate climate for private sector activities;
by sharing risks when the national interest is
served, and by providing research, development
and demonstration support complementary to that
of industry for technologies that are judged
outside the range of normal industry risktaking. Some think the Department and the
Office of Management and Budget have not accur
ately interpreted the latter.

Changes to licensing regulations are reported
to be sent to the Vice President's Task Force
on Regulatory Relief by early 1982. A nuclear
power public information program is reportedly
in the mill, something that was actively dis
couraged and discontinued under the previous
Administration.
Finally, the Department is addressing the
matter of obstacles and, of course, what alter
natives there are to dealing with them. A
big problem here is finding a politically pala
table Federal role.
The obstacle list looks something like this:
• Uncertain future demand for electricity.
t Lack of national commitment to nuclear
energy.
• Uncertainty about Federal policy for radio
active waste management, use of reprocessing
and fast breeder reactors.
t Regulatory and licensing uncertainties in
cluding expensive schedule delays for
retrofits.

The waste program has been re-focussed oh find t Discontinuities between utility planning
ing three sites for exploration as a possible
horizons that cover whole regions and span
location for a test and evaluation facility;
ten years and regulatory horizons that
the final choice of site is to be made by the
usually cover individual states and span
middle of the decade. Emplacement of waste
only a few years.
in this facility would begin before the end
of the decade, as would submittal to NRC of a
• Rate regulation that covers historical not
license application for a repository. Program
current costs.
costs are in large part to be covered by prior
collection of fees from industry. Essential
• An incentive structure in which benefits
supportive legislation has not yet been passed
accrue to rate-payers and risks to stock
but is reported much closer than ever before.
holders.
The Department has been searching for ways to
foster a climate in which the private sector
would again invest in reprocessing. A number
of approaches have been considered such as a
COMSAT-like institution, but so far without
apparent success. Electric utilities are at
best disinterested. The greatest stumbling
block appears to be that the Administration
has not yet found a way to come to grips with
the fact that the private sector needs and
warrants protection against just the kind of
Government policy changes that have occurred
in this area over the last 5 years. These
changes constitute nonbusiness risks.

The initiatives and programs already discussed
aim at many of these and there are other re
medies that focus on one component or another
on this obstacle course. They include: re
gional regulation; deregulation; increased
public ownership; diversification or horizontal
integration; longer commission terms; and
repeal of laws that affect utilities like the
Public Utility Holding Act, sections of the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act and
of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act.
All of these one can expect the Government to
study.
Important considerations are that a package of a
policy instruments (no one instrument can have
the necessary scope) that improves the ability
of utilities to invest in new electric genera
tion must do so by simultaneously improving
the financial bottom line of the utility, its
capital formation ability, and by providing
an adequate return on investment* Many of the
measures put forward so far do not meet all

The Department is seeking to accelerate the
CRBR and hopes to break ground in March, 1982
dependent on favorable NRC action and to
achieve criticality before the end of the
decade. It hopes to begin the commercializa
tion process by obtaining industry financial
commitment to the next large developmental
plant of about 1000 MWe.
7-19

three requirements; some in fact simply mini
mize near-term financial losses and either ig
nore the long term or may be harmful in the long
term. Moreover, it is well to remember that the
patient is not always the most reliable source
on effective remedies. It was the Savings and
Loan industry itself that came up with All
Savers Certificates on which they must pay high
interest to people who save in the short term;
a so-called remedy for their problem of re
ceiving low interest payments on long term
mortgages. As a result of this ill-conceived
legislation, the Federal Government is having
to bail them out. The investment decision
process within the utility industry has changed
with all the financial problems it faces. In
order for the Government to impact investment
decisions in new generation equipment, it must
first understand the forecasting and decision
processes the industry uses.

tainty about the problem that must be resolved.

Three years after the accident at Three Mile
Island, clean-up has barely begun. It is
difficult to summarize the series of delays,
false starts and roadblocks the utility has
had to contend with. Resolving the situation
rapidly was recognized early as being in the
interest of all parties, the entire industry,
the utility, state and local government, the
residents, and the Federal Government. The
most important remaining issue is how to
finance the estimated one billion dollar
clean-up costs, costs that will escalate
with every month of delay. A complex arrange
ment initiated by Pennsylvania Governor
Thornburgh has come close to success involving
the utility's rate commission, contributions
from the industry (but that requires legisla
tion in the Congress) state taxes and the
Federal Government. But the key to the plan
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 provides were the revenues expected from re-starting
for tax deferral on reinvested stock dividends, Unit 1 at Three Mile Island very soon. Recently
accelerated capital cost recovery on plants put those prospects dimmed. It is urgent that
in service after 1980, and the trading of cash this situation be resolved.
for investment tax credits through leverage
In summary, the atmosphere is better, the
leasing. But it will surely not be a remedy
Administration is much more supportive and
for all the industry's financial ills. While
the Congress is probably less negative. But
the Economic Recovery Program as a whole, if
it works, should do much to improve the picture there are still a lot of people in Congress
by reducing inflation and interest rates there who would rather not see nuclear succeed and
much of what the Administration is trying to
are many who think that more is needed.
do programmatically does depend on successful
di
legislation. And the public? The public has
and
many
are
there
that
is
certain
is
What
not yet made up its mind and until it sees real
verse interested parties to be considered and
progress on waste management and a resolution
that consensus will be hard to come by. What
one certainly hopes is that the Federal Govern at Three Mile Island it probably won't. That
ment will exercise the necessary leadership or is where our leaders must concentrate their
efforts.
catalyst role to come to closure rapidly.
Are things better now, how do they look for
the future? Yes and no, full of hope but not
great expectation! The fact is that we're in
a recession, so the short term still looks
bleak. A lot of things have been done by the
industry and the Government that are essential
if things are to improve. And as Deputy
Secretary of Energy Davis said recently: "It's
rather hard to overcome within a few months
the rather dedicated work of a number of people
over several years to screw the business up."
But key things remain to be done. Two of the
most important are ensuring there is adequate
storage for spent fuel and clearing the impasse
at Three Mile Island. Utility operators face
the prospect of shutting down power plants as
their storage facilities fill up, some as early
as the mid-1980's. Some utilities have pro
vided for increased capacity at existing sites,
and some are counting on shipping spent fuel
from one reactor to the storage facility at
another reactor that has capacity available.
Many contend that the Administration must re
store support for interim storage at away-fromreactor facilities. Clearly there is uncer
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